Here:
When federal legislation gives the States a real choice whether to accept or decline a federal aid package, the federal-state relationship is in the nature of a contractual relationship. See Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U. S. 181, 186 (2002); Pennhurst, 451 U. S., at 17. And just as a contract is voidable if coerced, “[t]he legitimacy of Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power . . . rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’” Ibid. (emphasis added). If a federal spending program coerces participation the States have not “exercise[d] their choice”—let alone made an “informed choice.” Id., at 17, 25.
However, nowhere in the opinion do I see a discussion of how ObamaCare is a coerced contract between the government and the individual, and thus no contract at all. The dissent instead focuses on how the States are being coerced into a contract with respect to the Medicaid expansion.
The reason for this is that the Court is deciding a case brought by the States which think they have been wronged in that respect. The Court is not responding to hypothetical individuals who believe they may be wronged in future, and who cannot bring suit until the provisions of ObamaCare have taken effect and they become actual individuals and victims of the law.
It may be surmised that the Court's dissenting opinions in this and other areas are intended to telegraph possible avenues for future challenges to which they may be sympathetic.
