Mortgage Securitization Only Works At The Expense Of Taxpayers And Banks

So says Arnold Kling for The American, here, who provides a useful summary of crony capitalist rent-seeking since World War II:

At this point, all signs point to victory by two of the biggest culprits in the mortgage crisis — the mortgage bankers (firms that originate loans to distribute, not to hold) and the Wall Street investment banks. Both depend on securitization if they are to participate in the mortgage lending process. However, securitization has only been able to compete with traditional bank lending when securities are backed by guarantees from the taxpayers and when bank capital requirements punish banks that hold their own loans.

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Arnold Kling is otherwise famous for his firm grasp of the obvious: "Most home owners are not libertarians."

Kudlow Is Right That Obama's Glorious Immediate Post-War Never Existed, But Completely Misses The Spending Cut Angle

Larry Kudlow, here:

[S]peaking in Galesburg, Ill., this summer, Obama served up a convenient historical fairy tale: "In the period after world War II," he said, "a growing middle class was the engine of our prosperity." Presumably he was thinking of a time when high taxes on the rich and industrial-union rule had the middle class soaring. The trouble is, Obama's history is wrong.

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Arguably, government spending cuts were the engine of post-war prosperity.

While Truman's record is second only to JFK/LBJ for real GDP growth in the post-war period, it occurred under special circumstances of extraordinarily deep government spending CUTS, which is little appreciated today when politicians and Keynesian and monetarist economists stress the importance of government spending for GDP. The truly remarkable thing under Truman is how the economy soared as spending decreased by TWO THIRDS from 1945 to 1947, as Arnold Kling reminded us here last year. Funny how Kudlow doesn't mention this. I guess they don't teach that at Princeton.

Under Truman's successor Eisenhower, real GDP growth slowed dramatically because of onerous levels of taxation maintained primarily to retire the war debts, but Eisenhower spent almost as frugally as Truman at the same time, making them the two best presidents we've had when it comes to small increases in the US public debt. That said, only the two Bush presidents and Obama have turned in poorer GDP performances than IKE. Funny also how Kudlow mentions only the one Bush. He leaves out the other one. You know, the "read my lips . . . no new taxes" Bush who ended up raising taxes.

Interestingly enough for US public debt growth, JFK/LBJ come in right behind Truman and Eisenhower while introducing the tax cuts which might have made Eisenhower's GDP record better than it was. Despite the guns and butter era under LBJ, the presidents occupying The White House between 1945 and 1968 were the most fiscally responsible we've had in the post-war, and it was a dramatic resetting of the baseline for spending LOWER under Truman which was the foundation of that period's economic growth.

Truman Cut Spending Big Time In 1945. The Economy Boomed.

Speaker John Boehner, wake up.

Arnold Kling, here:

When World War II ended in 1945, President Harry Truman faced a problem. Public opinion called for a rapid demobilization that would bring the boys home as soon as possible. But the Keynesians who were gaining prominence in the economics profession warned that a rapid decline in government spending and the size of the public work force would produce, in the late economist Paul Samuelson’s words, “the greatest period of unemployment and dislocation which any economy has ever faced.”

Thankfully, Truman ignored the Keynesians. Government spending plummeted by nearly two-thirds between 1945 and 1947, from $93 billion to $36.3 billion in nominal terms. If we used the “multiplier” of 1.5 for government spending that is favored by Obama administration economists, that $63.7 billion plunge should have caused GDP to fall by $95 billion, a 40 percent economic decline. In reality, GDP increased almost 10 percent during that period, from $223 billion in 1945 to $244.1 billion in 1947. This is a rare precedent of a large drop in government spending, so its economic consequences are important to understand.

Like Liberals, Libertarians Hate Homeowners

Like liberals, libertarians hate homeowners.

Liberals resent the competition and don't want them "moving on up" to the East Side or to their gated communities, ruining the neighborhood, and libertarians hate homeowners' bourgeois values, especially the fact that homeowners resist becoming interchangeable parts in their global corporate pursuit of economic efficiency, rather resent being treated like depreciating assets, and often think the most important gift they can give the country is future taxpayers and productive workers raised in stable, safe, socially well-adjusted environments.

But there is also a shared reason: because homeowners tend to be neither liberal nor libertarian, but conservative.

From libertarian Arnold Kling, in his own words:

'If there is a tendency for property owners to become libertarians, I find this difficult to observe. Clearly, most home owners are not libertarians. Some owners, in fact, become decidedly unlibertarian NIMBYs, where “not in my backyard” becomes their byword for infringing on the liberties of others.'

Damn right, Arnold, homeowners do tend to infringe on others' rights, just like the Decalogue infringes on my right to say everything that's on my mind, murder, steal, commit adultery, covet, practice idolatry and ignore filial responsibilities.

If you want to act like a reprobate, it's a free country, but not in my backyard.

The Dodd Bill Makes Moral Hazard Government Policy

An Opinion from The Washington Examiner

Run against Wall Street

By: Michael Barone

Senior Political Analyst

04/01/10

Senate Banking Committee Chairman Christopher Dodd, after spending some time negotiating with committee Republicans Bob Corker and Richard Shelby, has decided to advance major financial regulation legislation without bipartisan support. Democratic spin doctors will try to portray the fight over this legislation as a battle between Republicans favoring lax regulation of Wall Street and Democrats favoring tough regulation.

But is the Dodd bill really tough legislation, particularly in its treatment of the major financial entities? My American Enterprise Institute colleague Peter Wallison argues that it is not, because it gives Too Big To Fail status to the big entities—Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. This is done by setting up a resolution process for a failing firm which protects creditors more than ordinary bankruptcy proceedings would. Wallison writes:

“From the perspective of its effect on the economy, it does not matter what happens to the company, or to its shareholders and management. The only thing that matters in a government resolution of a failing company is what happens to the creditors--because it's the creditors that will provide the funds preferentially and at favorable rates to large companies rather than small ones.

"In this respect, the Dodd bill does it again--it signals to creditors that they will get a better deal if they lend to the big regulated firms rather than their smaller competitors, and it does this by making it possible for creditors to be fully paid when a too-big-to-fail financial firm is liquidated, even though this would not happen in bankruptcy. There are a number of ways that this can be done, including through a simple merger with a healthy firm. As a prescription for moral hazard, this can hardly be surpassed. The creditors will line up to provide cheap money to the too-big-to-fail firms the Fed will be regulating.”

Wallison is not alone in taking this view. Clive Crook, writing in National Journal seems to agree:

“You do not deal with ‘too big to fail’ by keeping a list of systemically significant institutions: By itself, that makes things worse. You do not deal with it by promising to let most failing financial firms, including those on your list, go bankrupt: Nobody will believe that promise. You deal with it by combining early FDIC-like resolution for all financial firms, banks and nonbanks alike, with stricter and smarter requirements on their capital, liquidity, and leverage.”

Libertarian economist Arnold Kling suggests an even tougher approach, though he doesn’t say how to put it into effect: break up the big banks.

I think as a matter of both policy and politics, Republicans ought to oppose the Dodd bill’s provisions that effectively grant Too Big To Fail status to a handful of financial institutions (and perhaps to other companies, Wallison has argued). They should oppose giving preferred status to the very largest firms as compared to smaller competitors. They should be prepared to argue that the Democratic bill gives vast advantages to firms whose employees have gotten huge compensation (and who, as it happens, tend to give more money to Democrats than Republicans). The cry should be, no favor to the big Wall Street fat cats. Mainstream media is unlikely to transmit this message but, as we have seen in the health care debate, messages can get through without them.