How does 200,000 COVID-19 deaths by the 4th of July sound to you?

Trump did not keep us safe.

Trump will never understand how he could have stopped this outcome even after failing repeatedly from Feb 1.  Which means we're in for much worse after July 4th unless someone gets through to him.

Sad.

Chart.

Zero Hedge gets ObamaCare spending all wrong, again

The latest screed is here, claiming that healthcare spending is "the reason" behind the surge in Q3 GDP.

From the BEA here, healthcare spending contributed 0.52 points (line 17) to 5.0 GDP, about 10.4% of the total.

Zero Hedge wants to leave the impression there was no single bigger contributor to GDP, which isn't the case at all:

Equipment contributed 0.63 (line 30)

Durable goods 0.67 (line 4)

Pure consumption from defense spending 0.69 (line 55)

Export of goods 0.69 (line 47).

More importantly, it's not like we haven't spent 0.52 points of GDP on healthcare before.

We spent 0.51 in 4Q2011, 0.70 in 1Q2012, 0.48 in 4Q2013, and 0.45 in 2Q2014.

That last one is really important. It's the third estimate final figure of healthcare spending for the immediately preceding quarter, which can now be compared to the third estimate final figure for this one. The difference? Just 0.07 points, for an increase in healthcare spending of 15.5% on an annualized basis from 2Q to 3Q. As I've said, we've seen such increases before, quite apart from any new developments over ObamaCare.

The proper comparison, notably, is with 2Q, not with the previous estimate of healthcare's contribution to GDP for the current quarter, which, like everything else, was admittedly incomplete in the BEA's own words, as is always the case with the estimates before the third and final report.

And what that shows, last of all, is that GDP hasn't "surged" at all between 2Q and 3Q. The only thing which surged is the final revision based on the more complete data. The quarterly measure of GDP is up a very modest 0.40 points, from 4.6 to 5.0, or about 8.7% on the annualized basis. Healthcare's share of that increase to GDP is just 17.5%. 82.5% comes from other categories.

The worrisome thing is all kinds of people read and sometimes quote Zero Hedge: Rush Limbaugh, John Hussmann and Bill Gross come to mind. And Real Clear Markets often links to it, which is how I saw it.

Zero Hedge is embarrassing to read, kind of like pornography.

The market crash is not coming with signs to be observed

John Hussman, here:

"Compressed risk premiums normalize in spikes.

"Those spikes will make it quite difficult to exit in the nice, orderly manner that speculators seem to imagine will be possible. Nor are readily observable warnings (beyond those we already observe) likely to provide a clear exit signal. Galbraith reminds us that the 1929 market crash did not have observable catalysts. Rather, his description is very much in line with the view that the market crashed first, and the underlying economic strains emerged later: 'the crash did not come – as some have suggested – because the market suddenly became aware that a serious depression was in the offing. A depression, serious or otherwise, could not be foreseen when the market fell.'"

Market cap to GDP ratios March 2009 vs. March 2014 flash valuation warning

Probably the broadest measure for stock market valuation purposes is total stock market capitalization divided by GDP. Warren Buffett uses it and John Hussman has spoken approvingly of the measure.

But because we have to wait for GDP numbers for at least a month after the quarter end, the ratio cannot be a real-time valuation tool. And given that revisions to GDP can be substantial in the 2nd and 3rd estimates, as well as in the annual summer revisions, precision using the 1st estimate is also wanting. Nevertheless the calculation provides a big picture snapshot of where we have been in the market cycle, and gives forward guidance for long term investors. Presently it appears to counsel taking chips off the table and waiting in cash for a better opportunity to invest. 

For the following I use nominal figures for GDP as revised in the most recent updates from bea.gov and calculate market cap using the popular Wilshire 5000 (level x $1.2 billion) as close to March 31 as practicable.

A comparison of March 2009 to March 2014 is instructive, since March 2009 was a pretty good buying opportunity both in terms of the absolute level of the stock market after its decline and the coincident Shiller p/e valuation which was about 13.3 on March 1. The ratio has almost doubled in the interim, indicating that now is probably not a good time to commit large new sums to stock markets. The current Shiller p/e begins the day at 26.31, which is also nearly doubled from five years ago.

That said, the 10 year Treasury presently pays just 69 basis points more than the dividend yield of the S&P500. At the October 2007 stock market high, the 10 year Treasury paid 276 basis points more than the dividend yield of the S&P500. You could argue the Fed caused the markets to crash by taking rates much too high in 2006 and 2007 and that Janet Yellen is bound and determined not to let that happen again anytime soon, meaning stock markets could have higher to go. Keep in mind that the inflation-adjusted all-time high of the S&P500 was 2045.09 on August 1, 2000. We're at 1962.46 this morning. 

March 30 2009

$10.32 trillion market cap

---------------------------------------------- = 0.72

$14.38 trillion GDP

March 31 2014

$23.99 trillion market cap

---------------------------------------------- = 1.41

$17.02 trillion GDP

Run away: Today's total market capitalization/GDP ratio is 1.46

$25.003 trillion
-------------------  = 1.46 (June 23, 2014: a really bad time to invest)
$17.101 trillion


$10.222 trillion
------------------- = 0.71 (April 6, 2009: a pretty good time to invest)
$14.381 trillion













h/t John Hussman, Warren Buffett

Shiller p/e vs. S&P500 p/e: Was either a guide to investing since 2008?

The merit of the Shiller p/e, which is backward looking, for timing investment decisions is cautioned against even by its supporters like John Hussman. It's something of a straw man to attack people like him for using it that way when they really don't use it to time market entry and exit points. Hussman views the indicator as one of a number of things which help him forecast 10-year returns going forward, a point lost it seems on people who don't read him carefully. High Shiller p/e levels in the present are part of an ensemble of indicators which to Hussman forecast low average annual returns over the course of the next decade.

That said, which has been the better indicator for timing a major allocation of monies to stocks in the recent past, the backward-looking Shiller p/e or the simple S&P500 p/e?

Today's Shiller p/e is a very high 26.06, 57.65% above its mean level of 16.53. The S&P500 p/e is 19.32, 24.56% above its mean level of 15.51. By both measures, today would seem to be a costly time to invest new monies in the stock markets.

How about during the March 2009 period when stocks tanked to their lows during the financial crisis?

The Shiller p/e actually told you to invest, hitting 13.32 on March 1, just days before the markets bottomed. In fact between October 2008 and June 2009 the indicator remained at or below 16.38, in other words below mean level, while the S&P500 inverted bell curve fell from 1100 to 683 and rose to 940. With the S&P500 now over 1900, any time during that woeful period looks in retrospect like a great time to buy. The trouble was that people didn't have any money to invest, being fully invested as usual, riding it all the way down after riding it all the way up.

The S&P500 p/e on the other hand was quite high on March 1, 2009 at 110.37, 612% above its mean level! It most definitely told you NOT to buy then, when you should have bought then. This indicator didn't hit its lows for the period, at the 13 level, until the late summer of 2011 and then only briefly, when interestingly enough the S&P500 was trading near 1100 again, in retrospect another very good time to buy. But at that time the Shiller p/e was above mean, at about 20, and you might have been forgiven for not taking the bait. But because you didn't you've missed an 800 point climb in the S&P500.

You have to go all the way back to the late 1980s to get an S&P500 p/e ratio consistently below 15, and even earlier to the mid-1980s for the Shiller p/e. All of which is to say that stocks have been rather expensive for quite a long time in general, coinciding with the generational focus on it as the way to make the big money for retirement.

In other words, we're in a bubble, and we blew it.

John Hussman: It's advisable to panic before everyone else does

From the irrepressible mind of John Hussman, here:

Market conditions presently match those that have repeatedly preceded either market crashes or extended losses approaching 50% or more. Such losses have not always occurred immediately, but they have typically been significant enough to wipe out years of prior market gains. ... On the basis of historically reliable measures, the S&P 500 would have to move slightly below the 1000 level to raise its prospective returns to a historically normal 10% annually. ... Regardless of whether the market’s losses in this cycle turn out to be closer to 32% (which is the average run-of-the-mill bear market loss) or greater than 50% (which would be required to take historically reliable valuation measures to historical norms, though most bear markets have continued to undervalued levels), it’s going to be difficult to avoid steep losses without a plan of action. In our view, that action should be rather immediate even if the market’s losses are not. However uncomfortable it might be in the shorter-term, the historical evidence suggests that once overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions become as extreme as they are today, it’s advisable to panic before everyone else does.

Shiller p/e hits 25.94 as total market index and S&P500 make the barest of new highs

The S&P500 floated up 0.19% while Vanguard's Total Stock Market Index Fund was up just 0.22%.

The Shiller p/e at nearly 26 is close to a level matched on the first of the month just 24 times going back to 1881. Valuation is presently 56.9% above the mean Shiller p/e of 16.53.

From John Hussman earlier this week, here:

On Friday, our estimate of prospective 10-year S&P nominal total returns set a new low for this cycle, falling below 2.2% annually. This is worse than the level observed at the 2007 market peak, or at any point in history outside of the late-1990's market bubble. 

Will The Phenomenal Gains In The S&P500 Since March 2009 To Date Be Cut In Half By 2019?

John Hussman, here:

Though we don’t have a 10-year figure for actual returns since 2009, investors should also notice that the improved valuations evident in 2009 will indeed have been followed by a decade of 10% S&P 500 total returns even if the total returns for the market over the coming 5 years are somewhat negative (which we view as likely).

The annual real gain for each of the almost five years to date is just under 20%, so a 10% annual return for each of the ten years in the period implies forfeiting half of what has already been made in the next five years.

Hussman has previously indicated that the vast majority of investors is likely to ride the coming decline all the way to the bottom.

"Our outlook continues to be more favorable for Treasuries going forward."

So says Market Anthropology's Erik Swarts, here.

"[O]ur current estimates of prospective S&P 500 total returns are negative on every horizon shorter than about 7 years," says John Hussman, here.

How Speculators Redistribute Wealth: Find The Greater Fool

John Hussman, here:

It is certainly possible for any individual investor to realize wealth from an overvalued security by selling it, but this requires another investor to buy that overvalued security. The wealth of the seller is obtained by redistributing that wealth from the buyer. 

John Hussman Is Right: High Valuations Since The Late 1990s Have Coincided With Smaller S&P500 Returns

Here's Hussman:

Yes, several reliable valuation measures have hovered at much higher levels since the late-1990’s than were generally seen historically. But that in itself is not evidence that these historically reliable valuation measures are “broken.” It matters that those high valuations have been associated with a period of more than 13 years now where the S&P 500 has scarcely achieved a 3% annual total return.

Here's Ironman's chart of S&P500 returns for the 15 years ended October 2013 showing a real, that is inflation-adjusted, total annual return with dividends fully reinvested of . . . 2.88%:

click to enlarge

Here's Morningstar's chart showing how much better you'd have done in intermediate term bonds like Vanguard's VBIIX, 5.88% nominal per year over the last 15 years (roughly 3.4% real), and that's including this year's bond slaughter:

click to enlarge

Here's the Shiller p/e as of this morning, clearly and excessively above the mean level of 16.50 for most of the time from the 1990s:

click to enlarge

Hussman says investors should expect poor returns from stocks going forward:

[S]tocks are currently at levels that we estimate will provide roughly zero nominal total returns over the next 7-10 years, with historically adequate long-term returns thereafter.

The Passive Long-Term Investor's Dilemma: Both Equities and Treasurys Are Unattractively Priced

From John Hussman, here:

So passive buy-and-hold investors – who lock in a price and don’t alter their investment positions for a long period of time – should recognize that Treasury bonds are likely to outperform stocks over the coming decade, with substantially less risk. In my view, neither asset class is attractively priced, but in a world of zero returns on Treasury bills, our risk budget for passive investors would lean more toward bonds than equities here nonetheless.

Vanguard's VTSMX Posts Record High Of 45.46 Yesterday, The 44th New High In 2013

This fund, Vanguard's Total Stock Market Index, has posted new all time highs in every month this year save June: one in January, six in February, six in March, three in April, NINE in May, six in July, two in August, two in September and six in October. They really bought in May and went away, but only for a month.

Yesterday's new high is the third in November.

Students of  log-periodic bubbles as described by Didier Sornette are paying close attention.

"Most Investors Will Hold All The Way Down"

John Hussman, here, last Tuesday:

'While we can make our case on the basis of fact, theory, data, history, and sometimes just basic arithmetic, what we can’t do – and haven’t done well – is to disabuse perceptions. Beliefs are what they are, and are only as malleable as the minds that hold them. Like the nearly religious belief in the technology bubble, the dot-com boom, the housing bubble, and countless other bubbles across history, people are going to believe what they believe here until reality catches up in the most unpleasant way. The resilience of the market late in a bubble is part of the reason investors keep holding and hoping all the way down. In this market cycle, as in all market cycles, few investors will be able to unload their holdings to the last of the greater fools just after the market’s peak. Instead, most investors will hold all the way down, because even the initial decline will provoke the question “how much lower could it go?” It has always been that way.'

"The Mechanism That Ended The Crisis"

John Hussman, here:

Rather, the crisis ended – and in hindsight, ended precisely – on March 16, 2009, when the Financial Accounting Standards Board abandoned mark-to-market rules, in response to Congressional pressure by the House Committee on Financial Services on March 12, 2009. The decision by the FASB gave banks “substantial discretion” in the values that they assigned to assets. With that discretion, banks could use cash-flow models (“mark-to-model”) or other methods (“mark-to-unicorn”). ... The misattribution of cause and effect in 2009 created the Grand Superstition of our time – the belief that Federal Reserve policy was responsible for ending the financial crisis and sending the stock market higher. By 2010, this narrative was so fully accepted that the Fed’s announcement of further “quantitative easing” was met by equally great enthusiasm by investors.

If profit margins were historically normal, the Shiller p/e would be about 29 here, not 24

So writes John Hussman, here, on Tuesday last:

Meanwhile, the current Shiller P/E (S&P 500 divided by the 10-year average of inflation-adjusted earnings) of 24.2 is closer to 65% above its pre-bubble median. Despite the 10-year averaging, Shiller earnings – the denominator of the Shiller P/E – are currently 6.4% of S&P 500 revenues, compared to a pre-bubble norm of only about 5.4%. So contrary to the assertion that Shiller earnings are somehow understated due to the brief plunge in earnings during the credit crisis, the opposite is actually true. If anything, Shiller earnings have benefited from recently elevated margins, and the Shiller P/E presently understates the extent of market overvaluation. On historically normal profit margins, the Shiller P/E would be about 29 here. In any event, on the basis of valuation measures that are actually well-correlated with subsequent market returns, current valuations are now at or beyond the most extreme points in a century of market history, save for the final approach to the 2000 peak.

-------------------------------------

You have been warned.

10-Year Treasury Rate Ends The Week At 2.64%

The 10-year US Treasury Rate ended the week at 2.64%, 43% below the mean level going back to 1871.

Despite the best efforts of the US Federal Reserve to suppress interest rates on behalf of other "investments" like housing and stocks, the current rate of the 10-year Treasury still bests the dividend yield of the S&P500 by 34%, which ended the week at 1.97%. From another perspective, it's even worse than that.

John Hussman noted this week here that based on the ratio of equity market value to national output, you might expect less than zero from the S&P500 going ten years out: 

Likewise, Buffett observed in 2001 that the ratio of equity market value to national output is “probably the best single measure of where valuations stand at any given moment.” On that front, the chart below [follow the link above] shows the value of nonfinancial corporate equities to GDP (imputed from March to the present based on changes in the S&P 500). On this measure, the likely prospective 10-year nominal total return of the S&P 500 lines up at somewhere less than zero. Suffice it to say that our estimates using both earnings and non-earnings based measures suggest a likely total return for the S&P 500 over the coming decade of less than 2.9% annually, essentially driven by dividend income, and implying an S&P 500 that is roughly unchanged a decade from now – though undoubtedly comprising a volatile set of market cycles on that course to nowhere.

In other words, it's possible stocks could return absolutely nothing over the next decade, or just barely beat bonds by less than 10% based on the current 10-year Treasury rate. For sleeping soundly at night, the choice is easy.

The 10-year Treasury rate has backed off about 10% since Ben Bernanke reversed himself on tapering bond purchases this month, seeing how it was knocking on the door of three.

Normalization of the 10-year yield would cost the US government dearly, jacking up interest expense costs over time which are paid from current tax revenues, by nearly double. In the last four years under Obama, interest payments on the debt have averaged $403 billion annually. Increasing those payments 43% would add another $173 billion to budgetary requirements, again, not all at once but over time.

Low Jobless Claims "Not At All Inconsistent With ... Maximum Market Risk"

So says John Hussman, here:

"[W]hile the low level of initial claims for unemployment has been a bright spot, the simple fact is that initial claims are almost always depressed at major market peaks, which contributes to the optimism and euphoria at those highs. ... the recent pattern of new claims for unemployment ... is not at all inconsistent with previous instances of maximum market risk."

QE Is For The Banks, Nothing Else

Quantitative easing is for the banks and nothing else, despite the long-standing professorial deflections to the contrary by Ben Bernanke.

Oh, he can say it's to help housing recover, or employment, or whatever else happens to be languishing depending on the exigencies of the moment. But God forbid Ben should say what everyone ought to have understood from the beginning, that there's a huge pile of non-performing loans on the banks' books. Ben's various iterations of QE have kept him busy systematically transfering to the books of the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States significant tranches of those bad loans, and it won't be until those transfers end decisively that you can be sure that the banks are finally in the clear.

Meanwhile, have you considered that when Keynes said markets can stay irrational longer than you can remain solvent that Keynes never imagined how un-free markets were to become in the Western world? Five years out from the troubles of 2008, that the purchases of MBS continue apace should at once frighten everyone and galvanize support to reform the banking system and prioritize the commitment of its central bank to the integrity of the US dollar.

The voices warning us are out there. You just won't hear them on your television, which you should turn off at a minimum, and preferably execute loudly in your backyard with a shotgun, or drop on your driveway from a second story window. Please send film.

Consider this from Manuel Hinds, former finance minister of El Salvador and 2010 winner of the Hayek Prize, here:

"[H]igher interest rates would burst the bubbles in asset prices that monetary printing has created, bringing to the surface the losses that banks have accumulated by years of lending to unsustainable activities. Thus, the Fed is between a rock and a hard place. If it does not increase the rates of interest, excess demand will explode leading to high inflation, large current account deficits or both. If it increases interest rates, the activities that are profitable only with very low interest rates will collapse, including the equity and commodity markets. This would expose the banks to very large losses, which would trigger a serious crisis because the banks have accumulated bad assets for over a decade now and have cleansed them only partially because they trust that the government will save them without having to take painful write-offs. As a snowball going down a slope, the problem gets worse with time. ... The coming breakdown is likely to be much worse than that of 2008."

Or this from Joseph Calhoun of Alhambra Investment Partners, here, who doesn't consider that QE is so negative for present GDP growth because it is "financing" past growth now ensconced as bad debt:

"There are any number of reasons why QE might be negatively impacting growth, from high oil prices to the diversion of capital to speculative purposes to its effects through exchange rates on other countries with which we trade. I do not claim to know the full extent of the effects of QE but most importantly, neither does Ben Bernanke. That being the case and considering the evidence to date, why does Bernanke persist in pursuing the policy? Is there some other reason for the policy other than the stated one of spurring economic growth? If so, Bernanke sure isn't telling anyone what it is."

Or this from the ever-wise John Hussman, here:

"Meanwhile, with a monetary base of $3.27 trillion and an estimated duration of at least 7 years on present Fed holdings, the recent 100 basis point move in bond yields has created a loss of over $200 billion for the Fed. The Fed reports capital of only $55 billion on its consolidated balance sheet. but then, just like major banks, the Fed does not mark its assets to market. Most likely, the Fed is now technically insolvent. Moreover, the Fed is levered more than 59-to-1 even against its stated capital. The benefits of QE seem vastly overpriced and excessively trusted, particularly in an environment where the internal debate even within the Fed is becoming more pointed. Two members already want the Fed to taper in order “to prevent the potential negative consequences of the program from exceeding its anticipated benefits.” ... We don’t observe any material economic impact from quantitative easing, and continue to believe that the key event in the recent credit crisis was the FASB move to abandon the requirement for mark-to-market accounting among financial institutions (the Fed’s zero interest policy has merely allowed banks to recapitalize themselves on the backs of savers and the elderly on fixed incomes)."

QE is financial repression of the American taxpayer for the benefit of institutions which should be wound down and broken up. How long are you going to put up with it? Can you last another five years?