Richard Duncan gets creditism wrong three ways
here for The Daily Reckoning last July in "Creditism and the Threat of a New Depression".
The most egregious error occurs right in the opening paragraph:
"Once we broke the link between dollars and gold, all the constraints on how much credit could be created were removed."
This is simply untrue, for two reasons.
One: Total credit market debt outstanding (TCMDO) has been doubling like clockwork in the post-war every six to eleven years, both prior to 1971 and after. The doubling of TCMDO occurred at its fastest pace -- two episodes of six year doubling times -- under Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, five years after the close of the gold window in 1971. Otherwise the doubling has never taken as much as twelve years, whether before 1971 or after.
And two: 1971 is irrelevant. It was not the end of the gold standard. The gold standard ended under Roosevelt. In fact, the close of the gold window under Nixon was the first patriotic act with respect to gold by an American president since Roosevelt. With the stroke of a pen, Nixon single-handedly stanched the outflow of America's gold reserves, which had dwindled under Democrat and Republican presidents alike from 20 tonnes to 8,134 tonnes.
Secondly, because Duncan doesn't understand just how often TCMDO has been doubling in the post-war, he completely misses its needed and now missing rate of growth, and the accompanying fact that under normal circumstances of creditism in the United States, TCMDO ought to be at least $81 trillion by now instead of $59 trillion:
'But at this point, the question is will credit ever begin to grow again enough to drive the economy? We now have such a large base, 59 trillion dollars. If we assume that the inflation rate is two percent, then we need total credit to grow by four percent so that total credit, adjusted for inflation, will hit this “two percent recession threshold”.'
The last time TCMDO doubled in the post-war was in 2007, at $50 trillion. At the slowest pace of its actual growth in the post-war, it should hit $100 trillion by 2018. We aren't going to make it. It is shocking that a former head of equity research for Salomon Brothers is so completely unfamiliar with the Rule of 72. When something doubles in six years, the implied annual rate is between 11% and 12%. When something doubles in eleven years, the implied annual rate is 6%. 4% isn't going to cut it, buddy, and the current rate between 1% and 2% is truly catastrophic by all historical norms.
Thirdly, because Duncan hasn't properly imagined our past, the future also eludes him:
"If you look at all the big sectors of the economy, there are just a few of them. You can see that none of them are going to expand their debt enough to make total credit grow by two percent."
That's right in its way. There is no sector currently capable of driving credit expansion as it did in the past. And the reason is because it was mostly housing in the past which drove the borrowing, and housing is effectively dead for such purposes now because of the way greedy Baby Boomers, whether as homeowners or bankers, fiddled with it to plunder the equity stored there or drive securitization. The effect has been to gut the basis of Americans' wealth and poison the balance sheets of the banking system.
The way out of this mess is so filled with trouble that it is little wonder neither John McCain, Mitt Romney, Hillary Clinton nor Barack Obama have made fixing it a priority. It is the glaring need of our time, a Goliath with no fear of a David anywhere. It is why the economic meltdown remains the leading story of our time. It is why our other over-commitments will be our undoing. Until we settle it upon a firmer foundation as was done in the 1930s, or find a different, surer basis for economic growth, many decades of economic shrinkage await, not just one or two:
"If this collapses now, we’re going to have an equally protracted crash, and it’s not going to be a matter of taking a pain for a couple of years. The consequences of it would, I think, be a replay of the 1930′s and the 1940′s, but this time with nuclear weapons involved."
