In 2018, Kotkin was still tip-toeing around the obvious, but not anymore:
Mussolini’s notion of fascism has become increasingly dominant in much of the world . . .
Mussolini,
a one-time radical socialist, viewed himself as a “revolutionary”
transforming society by turning the state into “the moving centre of
economic life”. In Italy and, to a greater extent, Germany, fascism also
brought with it, at least initially, an expanded highly populist welfare state much as we see today.
Mussolini’s idea of a an economy controlled from above, with generous
benefits but dominated by large business interests, is gradually
supplanting the old liberal capitalist model. ...
fascism — in its corporate sense — relies on concentrated economic power to achieve its essential and ideological goals. ...
China, in many aspects the model fascist state of our times, follows Il Duce’s model of cementing the corporate elite into the power structure. ...
But in the battle between the two emergent fascist systems, China
possesses powerful advantages. Communist Party cadres at least offer
more than a moralising agenda; they can point to the country’s massive reduction of extreme poverty and a huge growth in monthly wages, up almost five-fold since 2006. At a time when the middle class is shrinking in the West, China’s middle class increased enormously from 1980 to 2000, although its growth appears to have slowed in recent years.
Like Mussolini, who linked his regime to that of Ancient Rome, China’s rulers look to Han supremacy and the glories of China’s Imperial past. “The very purpose of the [Chinese Communist] Party in leading the people in revolution and development,” Xi Jinping told party cadres a decade ago, “is to make the people prosperous, the country strong, and [to] rejuvenate the Chinese nation.”
Kotkin recognizes at least that American right-wing libertarianism is part of the problem, not part of the solution:
the consolidation of oligarchic power is supported by massive lobbying operations and dispersals of cash, including to some Right-wing libertarians, who doggedly justify censorship and oligopoly on private property grounds.
Regrettably, however, Kotkin still does not connect this failure of the old liberal order in the West with the failure of the old moral order which gave it birth and on which it depended. This is because Kotkin still sees things in primarily materialistic terms.
Kotkin is oddly politically correct when he denounces possible recourse to nativism, which blinds him to the nativism which is at the heart of Chinese state capitalism and gives it much of its appeal and strength. He calls for "a re-awakening of the spirit of resistance to authority" in the West, not realizing that it was Protestantism which made that even possible in the first place.
The problem of the West is spiritual, and Catholicism will never be able to rise to the occasion of refounding it as long as globo-homo defines Rome. The whole idea is inimical to the notion of founding a nation "for our posterity".
