That's what I read in the new State Budget Crisis Task Force Report, here:
Under current assumptions used by actuaries to value liabilities, state and local government pensions are underfunded by approximately $1 trillion. Economists and financial analysts generally believe that liabilities should be valued using “low risk” discount rates, which would lead to much higher liability estimates. Under this approach, estimated unfunded pension liabilities are $3 trillion or more. ...
Most state and local governments have promised, in addition to pensions, substantial retirement health care benefits to their workforces. These benefits have barely any funding. In addition to health care, sometimes there are other benefits provided in retirement, such as life insurance; in combination all of these are known as “Other Post-Employment Benefits” (OPEB). Until the Governmental Accounting Standards Board in 2004 issued standards requiring disclosure, governments did not regularly make these liabilities public. ...
State-administered OPEB plans have unfunded liabilities of more than $600 billion. Similar liabilities for locally administered plans are likely even larger, since local workforces are almost three times as large as state workforces. The combined state and local government liabilities are likely to be well above $1 trillion. If the federal government increases the eligibility age for Medicare, OPEB liabilities could increase further, because state and local government retiree health plans generally provide substantial benefits for the transition period between retirement (usually under age 65) and eligibility for Medicare.
Most governments fund these benefits on a pay-as-you-go basis rather than contributing to a funded plan.
The New York Times discusses the report, as reproduced here.
Municipal bond investors will want to weigh seriously this language from the report:
Recently, the number of municipal bond downgrades for governments has outnumbered upgrades. States are finding it difficult to ignore their local governments’ increasing fiscal distress. A few states, including North Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, have well-established, effective procedures for monitoring and assisting local governments before they encounter acute fiscal distress . . .. More recently, Michigan has established significantly expanded oversight procedures. But most states wait until local governments approach fiscal insolvency or seek aid from the state before intervening. There appears to be growing recognition in the financial community and the states themselves that state monitoring, supervision, and early state involvement in solving local government fiscal problems is sound policy for both levels of government. But it will require skilled political leadership at the state level to overcome local government resistance to what localities often regard as intrusions on their right to self-government.
