The 3-Month Treasury Yield Is An "Abomination"

So says John Hussman, here:

The 3-month Treasury yield now stands at a single basis point. Unwinding this abomination to restore even 2% Treasury bill rates implies a return to less than 10 cents of monetary base per dollar of nominal GDP. To do this without a balance sheet reduction would require 12 years of 6% nominal growth (which is fairly incompatible with sub-2% yields), a more extended limbo of stagnant economic growth like Japan, or significant inflation pressures – most likely in the back half of this decade. The alternative is to conduct the largest monetary tightening in the history of the world.

Normalization of yields to even 2% implies 50% balance sheet contraction [see his last graph].

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The latter would mean a contraction of $1.55 trillion or so based on the current level, and that those securities would not mature on the balance sheet for their respective terms and come off naturally over time but quickly in a disorderly fashion, and therefore a bond market debacle is implied, and that to be defensive under this threat is to remain in cash, painful as that is.

Why you shouldn't feel "forced" to own stocks.

"The perception that investors are 'forced' to hold stocks is driven by a growing inattention to risk. But Investors are not simply choosing between a 3.2% prospective 10-year return in stocks versus a zero return on cash. They are also choosing between an exposure to 30-50% interim losses in stocks versus an exposure to zero loss in cash. They aren’t focused on the 'risk' aspect of the tradeoff, either because they assume that downside risk has been eliminated, or because they believe that they will somehow be able to exit stocks before the tens of millions of other investors who hold an identical expectation that they can do so."

-- John Hussman, here

If QE Were Cash Going Straight To Shareholders, Markets Would Be Up Just 6%/Year

But, of course, stocks are up almost 17% in the last year, and just under 13% annually over the last three years, and QE is NOT reaching the stock markets anywhere near so efficiently as it would if it were a direct cash distribution to shareholders.

So the penetrating thinker, John Hussman, here:

[T]he suppression of risk premiums [is] the remaining and primary effect of QE. In other words, QE has not increased the value of equities. It has only increased the price, but that increase in price has no significant fundamental underpinning.

To see this, first consider cash flows. Imagine that instead of attempting to boost stock prices indirectly through quantitative easing, the Fed took the candy-land approach of literally handing the $85 billion directly to stockholders to reward them for owning stocks. How much would that direct cash distribution benefit a stock market with a $17 trillion market capitalization? Do the arithmetic. Only 0.5% a month. Yet investors have chased prices at a far more rapid pace as a result of quantitative easing. Remember, of course, that the Fed is not in fact distributing cash to shareholders.

Presently the effect of such QE would probably be even less than 0.5% per month if every point of the Wilshire5000 represents a multiple of $1.2 billion, yielding a total market cap far higher than $17 trillion. A 0.4% per month rate of QE on $20.5 trillion of total market cap comes to $82 billion a month.

John Hussman Warns Correlation Is Not Causation

Here in "Two Myths and a Legend":

'This first myth is embodied in statements like “since 2009, there has been an 85% correlation between the monetary base and the S&P 500” – not recognizing that the correlation of any two data series will be nearly perfect if they are both rising diagonally. As I noted last week, since 2009 there has also been 94% correlation between the price of beer in Iceland and the S&P 500. Alas, the correlation between the monetary base and the S&P 500 has been only 9% since 2000, and ditto for the price of beer in Iceland (though beer prices and the monetary base have been correlated 99% since then). Correlation is only an interesting statistic if two series show an overlap in their cyclical ups and downs. ...

'In the case of quantitative easing, much of what we observe as “causality” actually runs the wrong way. Market declines cause QE in the first place, and the result is a partial recovery of those declines.'

Why The Shiller p/e Might Mean The Market Has Room To Run

The market might have room to run if excluding the bubble period from the calculation of the Shiller p/e is any guide.

So John Hussman, here:

"Excluding the bubble period since mid-1995, the average historical Shiller P/E has actually been less than 15."

That means the bubble period skews the calculation of today's historical average of 16.46 upward by something like 9%. So with a current Shiller p/e of 23.35 which looks backward incorporating bubble-era p/es into its calculation, a discount of 9% yields a truer Shiller p/e presently of something more like 21.25, which could mean there is still considerable upside potential in the market.

Today's Shiller p/e would have to rise to about 26.4 to reflect the old upper range redline of 24 identified by Hussman as a danger zone.

Interestingly, the March 1, 2009 Shiller p/e of 13.32 was therefore more like 12.1, quite the buying opportunity indeed, though nowhere near the 7 identified by Hussman as that rare thing marking the buying opportunity of a lifetime.

I wish I had had the courage to get in in March 2009. The real average annual rate of return in the S&P500 from then to January 2013 has been +19.14%, simply amazing. But as late as May 2010 people like Richard Russell were telling us to get out of debt and get completely liquid because technical analysis was predicting Armageddon was 6 months away. By August he had changed his tune.

Near term I am somewhat less pessimistic than I was, if only because a real blow-off top looks more definable than before. I'm still keeping my powder dry.

More Bonds Held Than Stocks Because There's More Of Them, Silly

John Hussman weighs in with his customary common sense, here:

'Quite simply, the reason that pension funds and other investors hold more bonds relative to stocks than they have historically is that there are more bonds outstanding, relative to stocks, than there have been historically. What is viewed as “underinvestment” in stocks is actually a symptom of a rise in the gross indebtedness of the global economy, enabled and encouraged by quantitative easing of central banks, which have been successful in suppressing all apparent costs of that releveraging.'

His regular Tuesday column is like a weekly appointment with a psychiatrist. The madness of a week melts away under his penetrating illuminations.

How S&P500 Might Be Not Just An Index But A Price Target

Another proverbial construction from John Hussman, who remains concerned, here:

'With little respite, the Shiller P/E has been above 22 since 1995, and the average Shiller P/E since that time has been over 27. To load that stretch into the calculation of the “normal level” destroys the whole concept of a norm: the valuation norm should be the level that is reasonably associated with “normal” subsequent market returns.'

"Valuations Remain Unusually Rich"

So says John Hussman, here:

Valuations remain unusually rich on our measures . . . it should be of some concern (though it is clearly not) that the price/revenue multiple of the S&P 500 is now above any level seen prior to the late-1990’s market bubble. Prior to that time, the highest post-war peaks were in 1965 (which was not followed by a deep or immediate decline, but marked the onset of what would ultimately become a 17-year secular bear market), and 1972, just before the S&P 500 lost nearly half of its value.

The Shiller p/e bears him out (esp. the post-war peak on January 1, 1966 at 24.06 vs. nearly 23 today, and the post-war nadir of 6.64 in July/August 1982, a 72 percent decline in valuation over the course of the secular bear and the mother of all buying opportunities since the war):

The price for performance remains steep.

How To Explain 2008: "Liability Without Control Leads To Disaster"

So John Hussman, here:

German Chancellor Angela Merkel explained the entire situation in five words: "Liability and control belong together." This is a profound phrase, because it also summarizes how the U.S. got into the housing crisis - the government deregulated the banking system and abdicated proper control, while still assuming the liability through deposit insurance and other government backstops. Liability without control leads to disaster.

The control was abandoned in November 1999 with the adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.

Nine years later, kaboom.

John Hussman Describes The Recent Victory Of Global Fascism, Without Using The Term

Just yesterday, in his column, here:

[O]ver the past 15 years, the global financial system . . . has been transformed into a self-serving, grotesque casino that misallocates scarce savings, begs for and encourages speculative bubbles, refuses to restructure bad debt, and demands that the most reckless stewards of capital should be rewarded through bailouts that transfer bad debt from private balance sheets to the public balance sheet.

What is central here is that the government policy environment has encouraged this result. This environment includes financial sector deregulation that was coupled with a government backstop, repeated monetary distortions, refusal to restructure bad debt, and a preference for policy cowardice that included bailouts and opaque accounting. Deregulation and lower taxes will not fix this problem, nor will larger "stimulus packages."  

John Hussman Notices Troubling Upward Revisions to Initial Claims Data

And remarks how few others have noticed:

"[W]e've been watching the new unemployment claims data for some time. Almost without fail, when a new number is released, the new claims figure for the previous week is revised upward by about 3000 or so. Last week, we saw an unusual revision in new claims data, not just for the previous week, but in months of prior releases, with upward revisions averaging about 10,000 in the most recent reports (e.g. the Feb 25 figure was revised from 354,000 to 373,000). ... Given that so much investor enthusiasm has focused on the new claims figures, it's interesting that the large and generally upward revisions in months of prior data seemed to go virtually unnoticed."

Read his complete remarks here.

Price to Earnings Ratios

John Hussman has an important article here on price to earnings ratios, in particular "forward earnings ratios," which came into vogue in the 1980s and for which there have not been adequate historical series preceding that era. 

In other words, forward earnings ratios are an innovation of the greatest bull market era in American history, and thus they are an outlier.

Follow the link for the complete story.